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Abstract 
 
Psychological inflexibility and experiential avoidance are key constructs in the Acceptance 
and Commitment Therapy (ACT) model of behavior change. Wolgast (2014) questioned the 
construct validity of the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-II (AAQ-II), the most used 
self-report instrument to assess the efficacy of ACT interventions. Wolgast suggested that the 
AAQ-II measured psychological distress rather than psychological inflexibility and 
experiential avoidance. The current study further examined the construct validity of the 
AAQ-II by conducting an online cross-sectional survey (n = 524), including separate 
measures of experiential avoidance and psychological distress. Confirmatory factor analyses 
indicated that items from the AAQ-II correlated more highly with measures of depression, 
anxiety, and stress than the Brief Experiential Avoidance Questionnaire (BEAQ). 
Implications include that, as broad measures of experiential avoidance, the AAQ-II and 
BEAQ may not measure the same construct. In terms of psychological distress, the BEAQ 
has greater discriminant validity than the AAQ-II, and perhaps an alternative instrument of 
psychological inflexibility might be needed to assess core outcomes in ACT intervention 
research. 
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Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999; 2012) has 
gained increasing appeal over recent years to a broad spectrum of clinicians and mental 
health professionals. A central assumption of ACT is that much of psychopathology is 
underpinned by a process of experiential avoidance (e.g., Hayes, Levin, Plumb-Vilardarga, 
Villatte, & Pistorello, 2013; Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, Follette, & Strosahl, 1996; Vilardarga, 
Estévez, Levin, & Hayes, 2012). Experiential avoidance is behavior that attempts to “alter the 
frequency or form of unwanted private events, including thoughts, memories, and bodily 
sensations, even when doing so causes personal harm” (Hayes, Pistorello, & Levin, 2012, p. 
981). The present paper does not address the efficacy of ACT as a therapeutic model. Indeed, 
there is widespread evidence for the efficacy of ACT based interventions across a wide range 
of psychological disorders (e.g., A-Tjak et al., 2015; Powers, Zum Vörde Sive Vording, & 
Emmelkamp, 2009). What is at stake, however, is the need for clarity on the distinction 
between experiential avoidance as both a process and an outcome (Chawla & Ostafin, 2007; 
Zvolensky, Felder, Leen-Felder, & Yartz, 2005). A number of researchers (e.g., Francis, 
Dawson, & Golijani-Moghaddam, 2016; Gámez, Chimielewski, Kotiv, Ruggero, & Watson 
2011; Gámez et al., 2014; Rochefort, Baldwin, & Chmielewski, 2018; Vaughan-Johnston, 
Quickert, & MacDonald, 2017; Wolgast, 2014) have raised concerns over the validity of the 
most commonly used self-report measure of experiential avoidance, the Acceptance and 
Action Questionnaire-II (AAQ-II, Bond et al., 2011), as an instrument to assess the efficacy 
of interventions aimed to reduce it. The aim of the current paper is to further examine these 
concerns with the discriminant validity of the AAQ-II. 
The ACT model aims to decrease experiential avoidance with an overriding goal of 
increasing psychological flexibility in clients (Hayes, et al., 2012; McCracken & Guiterrez-
Martinez, 2011; McCracken & Morley, 2015), while targeting rigid fused thoughts and 
problematic rule-following behavior that leads to the development and maintenance of 
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psychopathology. Psychological flexibility is referred to as the “ability to contact the present 
moment more fully as a conscious human being, and to change or persist in behavior when 
doing so serves valued ends” (Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda, & Lillis, 2006, p. 6). As a 
construct it is conceptualised as a continuum, with psychological flexibility at one end and 
psychological inflexibility at the other. The ACT model of psychological flexibility 
comprises six component processes, referred to as the hexaflex, and includes cognitive 
defusion, contact with the present moment, self-as-context, acceptance, values, and 
committed action (Hayes et al., 2013). The overarching focus is on all six processes of the 
hexaflex (i.e., creating psychological flexibility), although it should be noted that a particular 
emphasis is placed on the relationship a person has with unwanted and difficult thoughts and 
emotions rather than the more conventional focus on the content of such private events (see 
Luoma, Drake, Kohlenberg, & Hayes, 2011). Psychological flexibility has been consistently 
demonstrated to be a moderator of psychological distress (e.g., Bardeen, Fergus, & Orcutt, 
2013; Bardeen, Fergus, & Orcutt, 2014; Gloster, Meyer, & Lieb, 2017; Kashdan & Kane, 
2011). 
Experiential avoidance can become a harmful process if it is largely rule-governed 
behavior that does not take context into account and is applied rigidly and inflexibly so that a 
large degree of effort is made to control, or struggle with, private events (i.e., thoughts, 
feelings, emotions) (Kashdan, Barrios, Forsyth, & Steger, 2006). The cardinal function that 
experiential avoidance plays in psychological health has been explored in numerous studies 
(e.g., Fledderus, Bohlmeijer, & Pieterse, 2010; Gerhart, Baker, Hoerger, & Ronan, 2014; 
Gerhart, Heath, Fitzgerald, & Hoerger, 2013; Kashdan & Breen, 2007; Kashdan, Breen, 
Afram, & Terhar, 2010; Kashdan et al., 2013; Machell, Goodman, & Kashdan, 2015; Zettle 
et al., 2010). For example, in a cross-sectional daily self-report questionnaire study, Kashdan 
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et al. (2006) concluded that experiential avoidance completely mediated the effect of emotion 
regulation strategies (suppression and reappraisal) on measures of psychological wellbeing. 
The original 16-item Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ; Hayes et al., 2004) 
was primarily developed as a tool to assess the construct of experiential avoidance. When 
Bond et al. (2011) published the revised 7-item AAQ-II the focus shifted somewhat to 
include an assessment of both psychological inflexibility and experiential avoidance, where 
the authors (as noted above) conceived of experiential avoidance as being synonymous with 
psychological inflexibility. A number of studies have supported the AAQ-II as a measure of 
psychological inflexibility (e.g., Fledderus, Voshaar, ten Klooster, & Bohlmeijer, 2012; 
Gloster et al., 2017; Pennato, Berrocal, Bernini, & Rivas, 2013). Furthermore, the AAQ-II 
has been used both as a measure of experiential avoidance that appears to explain additional 
variance above and beyond traditional coping strategies  (e.g., self-distraction, positive 
reframing, denial; Karekla & Panayiotou, 2011), and as a measure of psychological 
inflexibility that accounts for variance beyond standardized measures of negative affect 
(Gloster, Klotsche, Chaker, Hummel, & Hoyer, 2011; Gloster et al., 2017). Although it was 
purportedly designed to assess all six components of the hexaflex model of psychological 
flexibility (Bond et al., 2011), it is still the most widely used instrument to test experiential 
avoidance (see Francis et al., 2016; Karademas et al., 2017; Lewis & Naugle, 2017; Sung, 
Park, & Choi, 2018; Vaughan-Johnston et al., 2017).  
Of particular interest for the current study, Wolgast (2014) claimed that the AAQ-II 
measured psychological distress rather than experiential avoidance or psychological 
inflexibility. Wolgast elucidated an apparent difficulty with the AAQ-II of its capacity to 
discriminate psychological inflexibility/experiential avoidance as a somewhat stable trait on 
the one hand and as an outcome measure on the other. This is related to concerns over the 
face validity of the AAQ-II (e.g., Gámez et al., 2011; Francis et al., 2016; Vaughan-Johnston 
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et al., 2017). It seems to us that one such potential source of confounded measurement is if 
the items that are purported to measure experiential avoidance/psychological inflexibility also 
contain formulations related to adaptive or maladaptive outcomes in terms of psychological 
distress, well-being, or overall psychological functioning. Furthermore, for many of the items 
in the AAQ-II it is difficult to distinguish if a specific response is grounded in levels of 
psychological inflexibility/experiential avoidance or, for example, in levels of experienced 
aversive emotions, memories, and worries. In other words, it seems to be difficult to know if 
the client is reporting distress, worry, experiential avoidance, or has become somewhat 
socialised to the ACT model. This issue is of critical importance for as Vaughan-Johnston et 
al. (2017) have put it “…the conceptual uniqueness of EA [experiential avoidance] is its 
consideration of how people feel about their feelings (similar to ‘thoughts about thoughts’ in 
the literature on metacognition…and therefore should not be redundant with measures of 
feelings themselves” (p. 335). As Gámez et al. (2014) have noted, researchers and clinicians 
need to have confidence that the measurement tools reliably measure the construct they 
purport to assess. 
Gámez et al. (2011) highlighted that the AAQ-II has poor discriminant validity for 
experiential avoidance as opposed to global negative emotionality (see also Lewis & Naugle, 
2017). More simply put, the authors found that the AAQ-II struggled to discriminate distress 
(e.g., negative affect and neuroticism) from experiential avoidance. In an attempt to address 
the inherent psychometric problems in the AAQ-II measurement of experiential avoidance, 
Gámez et al. (2011) first developed the 62-item Multidimensional Experiential Avoidance 
Questionnaire (MEAQ), which comprises six subscales covering a broad gamut of the 
experiential avoidance construct: behavioral avoidance, distress aversion, procrastination, 
distraction/suppression, repression/denial, and distress endurance. Gámez et al.’s initial data 
indicated that the MEAQ reported lower correlation scores than the AAQ-II with low mood 
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and neuroticism, a finding supported by Vaughan-Johnston et al. (2017). For clinical utility 
and overall ease of use in clinical settings, Gámez and colleagues subsequently published a 
15-item version, known as the Brief Experiential Avoidance Questionnaire (BEAQ; Gámez et 
al., 2014). Early indications suggest that the BEAQ sufficiently discriminates from measures 
of psychopathology (e.g., negative affect) and perhaps may be the more appropriate 
psychometric tool to assess experiential avoidance than the AAQ-II. One goal of the present 
study is to provide a key test of the construct validity of the AAQ-II by assessing the 
discriminant validity of both the AAQ-II and the BEAQ as measures of experiential 
avoidance. If both instruments measure experiential avoidance as a construct, they should be 
highly correlated in a confirmatory factor analysis and both should not correlate highly with 
psychological distress. 
It should be acknowledged that Wolgast (2014) employed an empirical method to 
create his own measures of distress and acceptance within that study, and with an exploratory 
factor analysis proposed a three-factor structure with the AAQ-II (i.e., psychological 
inflexibility) and psychological distress loading on the same factor. While this strategy 
certainly has some merit, the measure of distress employed may be regarded as a 
methodological weakness as it was not a well-established clinical measurement tool with 
validated norms and known psychometric properties. However, Wolgast did test his measure 
with a sample of 30 ACT therapists to attempt to establish some validity for the tool. The 
current study, therefore, sought to provide a key test of Wolgast’s (2014) findings by 
systematically improving upon Wolgast’s research design and included a well validated 
measure of psychological distress, the Depression Anxiety and Stress Scales-21 (DASS-21; 
Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995; see also Henry & Crawford, 2005).  
The main aim of the current study is to extend and improve upon Wolgast’s (2014) 
work and provide a critical examination of the concerns with the validity of the AAQ-II as a 
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measure of experiential avoidance and psychological inflexibility, and the specific claim that 
it in fact is a more direct measure of psychological distress (i.e., the outcome rather than the 
process of experiential avoidance). Participants completed measures of psychological 
inflexibility and experiential avoidance (AAQ-II), experiential avoidance alone (BEAQ), and 
psychological distress (DASS-21) in an online cross-sectional survey design. It was 
predicted, on the basis of recent research (e.g., albeit with the MEAQ; Lewis & Naugle, 
2017; Rochefort et al., 2018), that the BEAQ would evidence greater discriminant validity 
than the AAQ-II with regard to depression, anxiety, and stress, in a confirmatory factor 
analysis.  
Method 
Participants 
Five hundred and fifty-seven internet users were sampled using an online survey 
distributed through emails to universities within the UK, social media platforms, and internet 
data collection websites designed for academic researchers (e.g., 
http:///www.findparticipants.com). The sample comprised of 354 females (64%) and 203 
males (36%). The participants ranged between 18 and 73 years of age (M = 27; SD = 11). The 
sample consisted mostly of American (49.2%; all who resided in the US) and British (15.4%; 
all resident in the UK) participants. The majority of participants were of white racial identity 
(83%) and employed in a broad array of industries. For example, participants reported that 
they were employed mostly within the health and social care industry (21%), education 
(15%), computer industry (10%), office and administration support (8%), sales (7%), 
government (6%), and arts and entertainment media (4%). Aside from the gender ratio, the 
sample was more diverse in age, racial identity, and present employment industry than in 
Wolgast (2014). There were 524 participants included in the final data analysis (see Results 
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section for details). Before data collection began, the study gained approval by the University 
of XXX Institutional Research Ethics committee. 
 
Measures 
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-II (AAQ-II) 
The AAQ-II (Bond et al., 2011) is purported to be a 7-item measure of psychological 
inflexibility. Participants responded to items using a 7-point Likert scale from 1 (not at all 
true) to 7 (completely true), (α = .93 in the present study). Test scores on the AAQ-II have 
demonstrated good internal consistency and test-retest reliability in community samples 
(Bond et al., 2011).  
Brief Experiential Avoidance Questionnaire (BEAQ) 
The BEAQ (Gámez et al., 2014) is a 15-item measure of experiential avoidance, and 
was developed with separate student, community and patient samples. Participants responded 
to items using a 6-point Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree), (α = .87 
in the present study). Sample items include: “The key to a good life is never feeling any pain” 
and “I would give up a lot not to feel bad”.  
Depression Anxiety and Stress Scales (DASS-21) 
To assess psychological distress, participants completed 21 items from the DASS-21 
(Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). The DASS-21 has been demonstrated to have sufficient 
construct validity in non-clinical samples (Henry & Crawford, 2005). Participants rated the 
frequency and severity of experiencing psychological distress in the last week. The items 
were rated on a 4-point Likert scale, where 0 represented “did not apply to me at all” and 3 
represented “applied to me very much or most of the time”, (α = .93 in the present study). 
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Procedure 
The three self-report measures were uploaded to the internet with the Qualtrics 
(Qualtrics, 2014) online survey system. Participants were emailed a link to the webpage and 
responded to demographic questions and clicked on a forced-choice Informed Consent 
confirmation question in order to proceed. A randomisation function on Qualtrics was chosen 
which selected the order of presentation of each of the three measures at random. 
Importantly, the order of items within each measure was not subject to randomisation in order 
to maintain the integrity of the psychometric properties of those measures. Participants 
completed all three measures in one logged-in session. A forced choice response format was 
employed and thus there was no missing data.  To avoid potential careless responding (e.g., 
Meade & Craig, 2012), all participants were required to confirm that they were both: (a) in a 
room free of any distractions, and (b) would read each question carefully and answer 
truthfully.  Any participant that selected ‘no’ to either option were directed to the end of the 
survey. 
Analysis 
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was conducted on the items of the AAQ-II, the 
BEAQ, and the DASS-21, using Mplus, version 7 (Muthén & Muthén, 2015). According to 
the literature on the three instruments, five latent factors were estimated. Specifically, items 
of the AAQ-II were loaded on AAQ-II factor, items of the BEAQ were loaded on BEAQ 
factor, and items of the DASS-21 were loaded on their respective subscale’s factor, namely 
depression, anxiety, and stress factors. Before conducting the models, multivariate normality 
of the data was assessed in two ways. First, Mahalanobis distance and its associated p-value 
were computed to identify multivariate outliers (CIT), dropping cases with p < .001. Second, 
a Mardia test was run on the remaining sample to test multivariate skew and kurtosis of the 
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model; a significant probability value associated to these tests indicates that data are still non-
normally distributed and suggests the need to use a robust estimator, such asmaximum 
likelihood with mean and variance correction (MLMV). 
In the CFA model, correlations among factors were freely estimated. Using the model 
constraint option in Mplus, differences between key pairs of correlation coefficients were 
computed to test their differences. Specifically, we tested whether correlations of the AAQ-II 
with each of the DASS-21 factors were larger/smaller than those between the BEAQ and the 
DASS-21 factors. Moreover, we compared the correlation between AAQ-II and BEAQ with 
each correlation of the AAQ-II with the DASS-21 factors. Before conducting the CFA, a null 
model in which all the variables were uncorrelated to each other was conducted to define the 
fit indices to be considered in the following analysis. Indeed, if the root mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA) of a null model is smaller than .158, incremental measures of fit 
such as the comparative fit index (CFI) or the Tucker Lewis index (TLI) cannot 
mathematically reach acceptable values (i.e., values higher than .90), thus they are 
completely uninformative (Kenny, 2015). If so, goodness of fit should be evaluated using 
absolute fit indices, such as RMSEA and the standard root mean square residual (SRMS). 
Values of RMSEA lower than .08 and .05 represent mediocre and good fit, respectively 
(MacCallum, Browne, & Sugawara, 1996), whereas values of SRMR lower than .08 
represent good fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). Moreover, the closeness of model fit associated to 
the RMSEA (Cfit of RMSEA) was taken into account as a further fit index, considering non-
significant probability values higher than .50 as evidence of good fit (Brown, 2015).  
Results 
12 
 
Thirty-three participants were considered multivariate outliers due to their significant 
Mahalanobis distance, thus they were dropped, reducing the sample to 524 cases1. Despite the 
exclusion of outliers, multivariate skew (M = 161.75, SD = 1.97, p < .001) and kurtosis (M = 
1928.05, SD = 4.75, p < .001) tests of model fit were both significant, confirming the 
multivariate non-normality of data and the need to use MLMV estimator. Supplementary 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of all the items included in the following CFA. The null 
model yielded a RMSEA of .116, thus only RMSEA, Cfit of RMSEA, and SRMR were taken 
into account in evaluating the fit of the following models. The fit of the CFA displayed in 
Figure 1 was good, with all the indices far beyond the recommended cut-offs [χ2(850) = 
1804.67, p < .001; RMSEA = .046; Cfit of RMSEA = .98; SRMR = .060]. Among the 
factors, the highest correlation detected was between anxiety and stress, r = .86, p < .001, 
95% CI = [0.83, 0.90], whereas the lowest one was between BEAQ and stress, r = .54, p < 
.001, 95% CI = [0.47, 0.61]. Table 1 reports the planned comparisons between correlations 
coefficients. The results indicated that the correlations between the AAQ-II and each of the 
DASS-21 factors (i.e., depression, anxiety, and stress) were significantly higher than those of 
the BEAQ with the DASS-21 factors. On the contrary, the correlation between the AAQ-II 
and the BEAQ did not differ from the correlations between the AAQ-II and each of the 
DASS-21 factors. 
Discussion 
 The current data present a challenging picture of the construct validity of the AAQ-II. 
The CFAs indicate that there was an adequate level of convergent validity between the AAQ-
II and the BEAQ, which suggests a certain level of construct overlap. Critically, the AAQ-II 
correlates more substantially with the Depression, Anxiety, and Stress scales of the DASS-21 
                                                          
1 We conducted an additional CFA including the multivariate outliers.  We detected no substantive differences 
between the analyses performed in this study. 
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than the BEAQ which provides some support for Wolgast’s (2014) conclusions that the 
AAQ-II may primarily be a measure of psychological distress (i.e., the outcome rather than 
the process of psychological inflexibility; Chawla & Ostafin, 2007; Francis et al., 2016; 
Vaughan-Johnston et al., 2017). Importantly, the design of the present study reflects a 
somewhat clearer and more systematic demonstration of the construct validity of the AAQ-II 
as a measure of psychological distress than Wolgast (2014) as it employed standardized 
measures alone (i.e., BEAQ, DASS-21) with known psychometric properties, whereas 
Wolgast developed some measures of distress and acceptance within his own study. 
 The current study also replicates previous research that have found substantial 
correlations between the AAQ-II and psychological distress (e.g., Bond et al., 2011; Gámez 
et al., 2011; Rochefort et al., 2018; Vaughan-Johnston et al., 2017). It should be 
acknowledged that Gámez et al. (2011) and Rochefort et al. (2018) also noted a strong 
correlation between the AAQ-II and negative affect. Indeed, Rochefort et al. (2018) 
demonstrated that the AAQ-II  functions more as a measure of negative affect, whereas the 
MEAQ (and also the BEAQ in subsequent analyses) functioned better as a measure of 
experiential avoidance. Our findings support those of Rochefort et al. (2017) in that the 
BEAQ appeared to have stronger construct validity compared to the AAQ-II in this study. 
This brings the face validity concerns with the AAQ-II to the fore, as it appears that the items 
are more confounded with traditional extant measures of depression, anxiety, or stress (or 
negative affect; Rochefort et al., 2018) than as a specfic measure of a higher order construct 
such as experiential avoidance. Further research is needed to explore the face validity 
concerns with the AAQ-II using an incremental validity technique with constructs that are 
suspected or known to be linked to the development of psychopathology (see Vaughan-
Johnston et al., 2017’s example of attachment anxiety) rather than studies that more typically 
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seek to merely reduce the correlations between the AAQ-II and measures of distress, or 
negative affect more generally. 
 It is possible that the small number of measures employed (3 instruments) could be 
seen as a limitation of the present study. Future research could consider including a wide 
variety of other measures of psychological distress from the general to specific (e.g., 
depression). It would be important in such research to keep the subject-to-item ratio (SIR) as 
high as possible as the temptation to use a large battery of self-report measures is strong.  
Indeed, a low SIR significantly reduces the possibility of correct factor solutions in factor 
analyses (e.g., SIR < 10:1; Costello & Osbourne, 2005).  For the purposes of the current 
study, the SIR was deemed acceptable (i.e., SIR = 12:1). A further limitation of the present 
study might include a criticism of common method bias (e.g., Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & 
Podsakoff, 2003).  That is, all data was obtained from the same source and thus may be 
subject to problems such as the consistency motif and social desirability bias. It should be 
noted that the presentation order of each of the measures was randomized across participants 
to reduce response bias. Future research could also consider including a wider range of 
measures of psychological distress along with a clinical sample, and, perhaps employ 
additional analytical techniques such as confirmatory factor analyses or structural equation 
modelling methods.  
 Future research could consider an examination comparing the validity of the AAQ-II 
versus the BEAQ in predicting overt avoidance behavior in controlled laboratory settings 
using clinical analog preparations. The currrent findings suggest, at the least, that the AAQ-II 
might be somewhat more predictive of subjective distress relative to overt behavioral 
avoidance (e.g., avoidance of an aversive stimulus). However, it should be acknowledged that 
this is mere speculation as we were not able to test this specific prediction with the current 
design. Moreover, while this proposition has not been examined empirically in any published 
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study to date, the lack of utility of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory  (Spielberger et al., 
1983), against which the AAQ was originally validated, to clearly predict avoidance rates of 
conditioned aversive stimuli has been noted (Haddad, Pritchett, Lissek, & Lau, 2012; 
Torrents-Rodas et al., 2013), and the attempt to understand why has already begun in 
empirical studies on fear conditioning (e.g., Vervliet & Indeku, 2015). At present, therefore, 
even though the AAQ-II and BEAQ are correlated measures, it seems that the most prudent 
course of action could be to utilise the BEAQ as perhaps a more focused measure of 
experiential avoidance due to it’s greater discriminant validity from psychological distress 
than the AAQ-II. However, while saying this, it should be acknowledged that it would be 
beneficial to incorporate the BEAQ in ACT-based intervention studies as part of a broader 
package of measures of psychological inflexibility and experiential avoidance such as the 
AAQ-II, the CompACT (Francis et al., 2016), the Avoidance and Fusion Questionnaire for 
Youth (Greco, Baer, & Lambert, 2008), and the MEAQ. 
It might be the case, however, that the BEAQ does not assess experiential avoidance 
as the construct is conceptualised within ACT as it could be argued that the focus appears to 
be more on overt behavioral avoidance rather than avoidance of internal private thoughts and 
feelings. However, upon closer inspection, four of the 15 BEAQ items derive from the 
MEAQ Behavioral Avoidance scale, with three further items (two from Procrastination and 
one from Distress Endurance) from other subscales of the MEAQ that could be regarded as 
specifically focused on overt behavioral avoidance. Thus, this still leaves over half of the 15 
BEAQ items with a particular focus on avoidance of internal experiences and attitudes.  
Nonetheless, it is difficult to find evidence for a clear emprically-based process account of 
why overt and covert avoidance behavior should not correlate or that one should have no 
influence over the other in the development and maintenance of psychopathological 
disorders.  
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 The present study highlights an important point raised by Wolgast (2014) and 
Kashdan and Rottenberg (2010) about the difficulty in reconciling a reliance on measures of a 
trait-like construct (i.e., psychological inflexibility and experiential avoidance) with an 
underlying philosophy of functional contextualism, which proposes that both psychological 
inflexibility and experiential avoidance are dynamic contextually-controlled behaviors, or 
forms of situated action (Hayes et al., 2004). The problem with the lack of construct validity 
of the AAQ-II as a measure of experiential avoidance is somewhat at odds with the theory of 
language and cognition that underpins ACT (Hayes, 2004), known as relational frame theory 
(RFT; Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001). More specifically, at the core of the 
functional contextual approach, from which RFT emerged, and which in turn provides the 
empirical basis for ACT, is a commitment to the prediction-and-influence over variables of 
interest (Guinther & Dougher, 2015). However, this is an ambitious goal given ACT’s more 
recent dealings with psychometric constructs such as psychological flexibility. There is a 
pressing need for future research to be conducted with tightly controlled empirical RFT-
consistent preparations that can demonstrate prediction-and-influence over the contextual 
control of core constructs of ACT, such as psychological flexibility, that could help inform 
the development of more useful self-report instruments that may take the contextual 
variability of behavior into account.   
 There could be an argument that the present study represents only a small incremental 
contribution on what is already known regarding the validity of the AAQ-II as a measure of 
experiential avoidance (e.g., Lewis & Naugle, 2017; Rochefort et al., 2018; Wolgast, 2014). 
However, we feel that there is emerging consensus, driven in large part by the Open Science 
Collaboration (OSC), that scientific merit does not necessarily equate to scientific novelty. 
Indeed, as stated by the OSC, “reproducibility is not well understood because the incentives 
for indicidual scientists prioritize novelty over replication” (OSC, 2015, p. 6). Furthermore, 
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as highlighted by the OSC, “the claim that ‘we already know this’ belies the uncertainty of 
scientific evidence…[and that] replication can increase certainty when findings are 
reproduced and promote innovation when they are not” (OSC, 2015, p. 7). Thus, we argue 
that the accumulation of similar findings and outcomes such as the current study and those of 
Rochefort et al. (2018) help us to clarify our scientific understanding of the reliability and 
validity of key measures of core constructs within the broader ACT model. Moreover, such 
accumulation of evidence could be an important driver to novel and innovative instrument 
development.  
 To conclude, the present study extends previous analyses of the construct validity of 
the AAQ-II (e.g., Lewis & Naugle, 2017; Rochefort et al., 2017) and found that the BEAQ as 
a measure of experiential avoidance appears to more sufficiently discriminate from general 
psychological distress than the AAQ-II. The AAQ-II appears to assess a construct somewhere 
between experiential avoidance and distress, thus losing a certain level of discriminant 
validity. While it could be argued that clinicians and researchers can be lead to re-focus on 
employing the AAQ-II as a measure of psychological inflexibility alone, such a re-branding 
is difficult in practice as the AAQ-II was first published as a measure of psychological 
inflexibility and experiential avoidance is ingrained in the literature (e.g., Karademas et al., 
2017; Karekla & Panayioutou, 2011; Sung, et al., 2018). Indeed, such a move could lead to 
conceptual confusion and would be at odds with the largely ground-up and inductive 
approach adopted by ACT and RFT. Thus, while the AAQ-II likely has continued utility as a 
measure of psychological inflexibility (see Gloster et al., 2017), it seems that from a scientific 
point of view, the most reasonable and cautious course of action would be for clinicians to 
consider the BEAQ as a measure of experiential avoidance, alongside broader measures of 
the overaching construct of psychological inflexibility. Moreover, such a development might 
even lead to greater evidence of the increased efficacy of the ACT model interventions 
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compared to more tradtional cognitive-behavioral therapies than has been observed 
heretofore.  
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Table 1  
Planned comparisons between correlation coefficients. 
Correlations pair   Difference score 95% CI  p value 
AAQ-II – Depression BEAQ – Depression 0.15 0.10, 0.20  < .001 
AAQ-II – Anxiety BEAQ – Anxiety 0.12 0.07, 0.8  < .001 
AAQ-II – Stress BEAQ – Stress 0.15 0.10, 0.20  < .001 
AAQ-II – BEAQ AAQ-II – Depression -0.01 -0.06, 0.04  .67 
AAQ-II – BEAQ AAQ-II – Anxiety 0.02 -0.03, 0.07  .48 
AAQ-II – BEAQ AAQ-II – Stress 0.03 -0.02, 0.08  .27 
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Figure 1: Results of Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
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